The author contends that knowledge of a country's history and culture is essential to opening doors and establishing and maintaining friendships and contacts. Perhaps more that most African societies, the Somalis have a deep awareness of their history, culture and past achievements.
The author attempts to stimulate some appreciation of Somali history and culture. For this reason, details are given of recent history so that readers will have some name and event recognition which outline the circumstances which led to the present situation in Somalia.
INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Somalia became an independent state in 1960 with the joining of the former British Somaliland, with its capital at Hargeisa in the northeast, and the Italian Trusteeship Territory, governed from Mogadishu. A present-day map of Somalia is shown in figure 1 . The total population of Somalia is believed to approach seven million (est. mid-1991) , although hundreds of thousands of lives have probably been lost to war, disease and starvation in the past 2 years. Somalia is one of the rare countries in Africa in terms of cultural affinities. All of the peoples of Somalia share common cultural roots, and they speak a common language and religion (primarily Sunni Muslim). English is spoken extensively in the north, but only sparingly in Mogadishu; the most common foreign language in the southern part of the country is Italian.
Somalis are divided into six major clan groupings and a vast number of sub-clans. People sharing Somali culture are spread over 400,000 square miles of the savannah and desert of the Horn of Africa. The majority live in modern Somalia (260,000 square miles), with another million or so living in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, another 240,000 in northern Kenya and over 200,000 in the Republic of Djibouti. The modern Somali political system is dominated by alliances and antagonisms among the clan and sub-clan groups. A list of these groups is provided in this Handbook, and we attempt to outline the latest alliances between the groups. The internal disorders which have torn the country apart in the past two years, and which led to Operation Restore Hope in late 1992, include many of the elements of classic ethnic conflict, as various clan and sub-clan units vie for power. The conflict in Mogadishu, of course, represents a more basic conflict between personalities within a clan that has never known such deadly cleavages. Before the time of troubles began a generation ago, Somalia was already one of the poorest countries in the world. For most Somalis, life for over a generation has been a grim struggle to survive in the face of unfriendly political systems, the arbitrary rule of a ferocious dictatorship under Siad Barre from 1969 until 1991, his quixotic war with Ethiopia (1977-78) , crushing poverty, periodic drought and fear of banditry.
Although the Somali people have an strong sense of history and their language has a rich and reportedly lyric poetic focus, the current writing style (Roman script) was only adopted as recently as 1972. Somali history remains primarily oral, and in this study we review the lives of two historical figures whose stories are intrinsic to Somali history and poetry. A primarily nomadic people, the Somalis have many age-old rituals and an elaborate sense of protocol. A Somali elder once complained to the author that his son, a senior military officer in Djibouti, was bringing "ignorant strangers" to his home. An "ignorant stranger" was defined as someone who could not recite his family genealogy to the 17th generation. Although much sapped at present by drought and starvation, the Somali people are hardworking and full of good humor. Personnel on assignment in Somali will find them to be interesting, proud, frustrating, subtle but hospitable people.
Somali people love to talk, and current business often takes a lower priority as Somalis recount lineage structures and family issues. Patience and a cool temper will gain faster and more satisfactory results in dealing with the Somali. One should not be put off by the fact that much of their conversation appears to be stimulated by the use of qat,' a mildly narcotic weed largely imported fresh from Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen (it grows only at altitude), which provides a mild high. Although the use of narcotics is prohibited by the Koran, the peoples of the Horn protest that it is not a narcotic and because it inhibits thirst, hunger and sleep while facilitating conversation, it serves a useful social purpose. The governments of Djibouti and Somalia have each made an attempt to outlaw the use of qat because it also lowers productivity and consumes a large part of a family's income. In each case, the governments relented because, if it were outlawed, the governments would be deprived of much-needed revenues. In Somalia, only the Salihiya religious order prohibits its use; all other religious orders condone it. There are indications that qat use among the rootless youth in present day Somalia has become excessive, and its use no longer appears to serve any useful social purpose.
Much of the chaos now reigning in Somalia can be traced back to the doctrinaire Marxism of President Siad Barre (1969 Barre ( -1991 and his aberrant decision to mount an invasion of Ethiopia in 1977. With heavy arms stockpiles provided by the Soviet Union, its erstwhile ally, the Somali President hoped to profit from instability within the government of Ethiopia and its declining relations with the United States to take over the territory of the Ogaden, where hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis lived. Using Ogadeni clansmen of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) for light infantry, combined with heavy Soviet armor, the invasion sealed the rupture with their Soviet allies and provided an opportunity for the Soviet Union to mount one of the largest sea and airlifts then known, as it came to Ethiopia's assistance. The Somali invasion was at first successful, and Somali troops arrived at the gates of Harar and the Highlands of Ethiopia. Within a few weeks of the commencement of the Soviet airlift in November 1977, Ethiopian and Cuban troops, backed up by hundreds of Soviet advisors (many of whom had served as advisors to Siad's forces), turned the tide. The beaten Somali troops were soon used by Siad Barre against their own populations, as restive sub-clan groups demonstrated their impatience with Siad's quixotic rule after the war was lost. After the Ogaden war ended, the United States hoped to substitute for its lost relationship with Ethiopia by obtaining a foothold in Somalia. The U.S. completed the near-finished Soviet air and naval installation at Berbera in northern Somalia, which served U.S. forces until the agreement was permitted to lapse in 1988.
Somalia has generally not had good relations with its neighbors. Somali culture probably plays a significant factor in this. A primarily nomadic society, with the exception of certain southern agricultural groups, traditional nomadic Somali culture does not recognize political boundaries or physical barriers. Considerable protocol and diplomacy has developed within the culture to control confrontations over the use of water holes or grazing facilities. In the precolonial period, the clash of nomadic Somali groups in search of water and grass led to numerous conflicts with the ferocious 'Afar groups which populated much of northern Somalia and with the Oromo (Galla) and Amhara populations of the Harar region of the Ogaden and the highlands of Ethiopia. The early 20th century colonial partition of the Horn of Africa led to the development of European spheres of influence and subsequent colonies by Italy, France and Great Britain in the early years of this century. The consolidation of Ethiopia under Emperor Menelik in the last decade of the 19th century also led to confrontations in the Ogaden. These external interventions separated the Somali people into five different colonial territories. As a result, one of Somalia's most important national goals, stated in its 1960 independence constitution, was the gathering of all Somali populations under one flag. Significantly, Somalia was the only African state not to support the applicable clause of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) signed in 1964, which stipulated that existing colonial frontiers should be respected. Siad Barre's attitudes towards the neighboring Republic of Djibouti, which received independence from the French in June 1977, reflected his hegemonic goal of uniting all Somali ethnic groups. Although Djibouti has a majority Somali population and had an independent government led by an ethnic Somali, it did not choose to join with Siad Barre's Somalia, an effective repudiation of pan-Somalism. Somalia's meddling in Djibouti's internal affairs periodically caused relations between the two states to be strained. Equally, Kenya watches with concern Somalia's efforts to stir up problems within its northeast ethnic Somali citizens. This led to some pre-emptive diplomacy on the part of Kenya's leadership to maintain outwardly warm relations with Siad Barre's Marehan clan. Somalia's painful war with Ethiopia in 1977-78 will not be forgotten in either state, and, although diplomatic relations have been restored, Ethiopia has generally been supportive of northern Somali separatist groups.
It has been the author's experience in Africa and elsewhere that knowledge of a country's history and culture is essential to opening doors and establishing and maintaining friendships and contacts. Perhaps more than most African societies, the Somalis have a deep awareness of their -4-history, culture and past achievements. This handbook is written with the hope of stimulating some appreciation of Somali history and culture; details are given of recent history so that readers will have some name and event recognition. The extensive chronology supplements the descriptive materials, in the hope of outlining the medium-term timeline which led to the present mess in Somalia.
A note on the spelling of Somali names: A number of sources have been used in writing the handbook. Before 1972, transliteration of Somali names was very much left to the discretion of authors. The result was a wide variety of spellings, mostly reflecting the native language or nationality of the authors. Since 1972, some authors have used Somali spellings, but most have simply continued older forms. The author has attempted to standardize spellings, using the most common spellings of American specialists. The Somalis have a playful enthusiasm for assigning nick-names for themselves and for visitors. This can sometimes be confusing. In this handbook, nick-names are placed in parentheses.
In addition to the supplementary readings listed in the Handbook, the author has regularly consulted The Washington Post, The New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, Le Monde (Paris), Africa Confidential (London), the Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), as well as a number of Africanist periodicals. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author.
CLAN HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION
A brief look at Somali ethnic history provides useful insights into the modern attitudes of the Somali people. The origins of the Somali remain a mystery that scholars continue to debate. Until recently, conventional wisdom was that the first Somali pastoralists came from the north and settled in the area of what is now southern Somalia about 1000 years ago. 2 A more recent source asserts that the most likely ancestral home of the Somalis was in the highlands of modernday Ethiopia, with indications that Somali peoples may have entered the lowlands of the Horn as long as 2000 years ago Their migrations into the grasslands displaced other cattle culture peoples whose names are lost to history. 3 With well-defined Abyssinian semitic influences, and inheriting some traditions from people already in place, the Somalis were also influenced by the trading communities of the Indian Ocean, especially the Persians, Omanis and the Yemenis. It is assumed that the Somalis adopted Islam as their religion as the result of their contacts with traders on the coast. Although the nomadic clans (see below) tend to be more broadly dispersed, such as the Darood located in central and southern Somalia, most clan groups have fairly welldefined geographical zones of activity. The Hawiye are located in the Mogadishu area, the Isaaq in the north, the Dir in the northwest and the Digil and the Rahanwayn in the river areas of the south. Mogalishu was one of the earliest entrep6ts for trade between traders and interior groups; the earliest description of the city is by the Spanish-born Moroccan traveler, Ibn Battuta, who visited Mogadishu in 1331. Other trading towns well-known to ancient travelers included Berbera and Zeila in the north and Merka and Barare in the south.
According to Somali tradition, two modern clans owe their origins to the arrival of Muslim saints.' The first is Sheikh Darood, who is supposed to have arrived in southern Somalia at the end of the 1 I th century and to have married the daughter of a Somali patriarch. Tradition says that the children of this union were the founders of the various Darood sub-clans. At the end of the 13th century, another Muslim saint, Sheiklh Isahaaq, arrived in northern Somalia. His descendants provide the legend of origin for the various Isaaq sub-clans. As the Somalis became more numerous, their search for new pastures and water holes assumed the dimension of invasions into northern Kenya, the Ogaden and Awash valley of Ethiopia. Other ethnic groups, especially the Oromo in Ethiopia, and the Afar in modern Ethiopia and Djibouti, resisted these incursions, establishing traditional antagonisms which endure to the present.
The political dynamic of Somalia is largely determined by clan and lineage structures. As noted on the ethnic map (Figure 2 ), the clans can be identified by their geographical locations. The larger nomadic groups tend to have sub-clans located along the length of Somalia. The clan schematic provided at Figure 3 can only be considered an introduction to the complexity of clans and lineages in Somalia. In section 3, we will outline the most important traditional features of the Somali political system. Despite the apparent homogeneity of Somali culture, there are very significant differences in status and life styles of the Somali people. Although great scholarly controversy exists about the origins of the Somali people, most Somalis believe that they are descendants of noble Arab,,, lineages and the family of the Prophet. 5 What is clear is that there are a number of Arabic words in the Somali language. Differences in spoken language also exist between southern and northern clans. The primarily agricultural Digil and Rahanwein groups who settled along the banks of the Juba and Shabelli rivers in the south speak a Somali dialect as different from the northern pastoral groups as that of Spanish and Portuguese. The nomadic clan families, the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Darood, believe that they are the "true Somali" and therefore have a higher status in Somali society. 'I ne southern groups only achieved some kind Laitin and Samatar, ibid., pp. 8-9.
I.M. Lewis, A Modern Biitory of Somalia, p. 5. dreams which were dysfunctional on the international level. Equally paradoxically, the decision to focus on a Figure 4 . supra-national Somali identity provided Somalia's neighbors and enemies virtually unlimited excuses to play one Somali group against another. In order to deflect attention from his narrow clan political base, an opportunistic dictator like Siad Barre found it easy to adopt a firm "anti-tribal" policy while doing everything possible to eliminate the internal coherence of enemy clans, subclans, religious structures and leadership. Siad's excesses eventually caused the collapse of the dictatorship, and today there are very few building blocks now available to initiate peace between clans and eventually to support the creation of a national government. Somalia today exhibits most of the frailties of a failed state, unable to provide protection or services.
The highest level of politics today in Somalia is clan politics. (See Figure 4 for the percentage distribution of the population by clan and kinship groups.) To understand the dynamics of Somali politics, it may be useful to look back at the structures of the colonial period. The Hawiye, with their geographical home in the region of Mogadishu, and the Isaaq, with theirs -9-in the area of Hargeisa, were well situated near centers of colonial governmental activity.' As a result, both the Hawiye and the Isaaq were predominant in the colonial civilian administration, and these groups continued to predominate in the administrations because they were in place at the time of independence in 1960. The colonial military, however, was composed of non-urban, nomadic groups. Italian and British native forces recruited Darood militiamen and gendarmes.
The Darood are particularly hearty and were not daunted by service in the most rugged and ard regions, far from the ports and the commercial centers located in the Isaaq areas of British Somaliland and the Hawiye areas of Italian Somalia. 7 Traditional rivalries between these groups were therefore reinforced by the colonial masters whose interests were the reverse of "nation building." Their interest was to find the groups most likely to support the continuation of colonial rule. Minister of Justice, a Marehan, was accused of ballot stuffing. It happens that the army commander, Siad Barre, was less interested in the fate of the nation than he was for the interests of his Marehan Darood ethnic compatriots in the army. The elections were followed, some months later, by the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke. As the rudderless parliament debated the succession, the coup occurred.
The timing of the coup obviously resulted from Siad Barre's personal decision to benefit from ongoing civilian disorder, but he also profited from army resentment at the efforts of the civilian regime to achieve d6tente with Ethiopia and Kenya, from concerns about shifts from military to developmental spending, police resentment at their deployment for partisan purposes and at the dismissal of a police commandant who had tried to prevent this. 9 Reportedly, Barre had covertly supplied rebels in Kenya and Ethiopia whom his civilian superiors were no longer supporting. Because the army was heavily Darood in composition and led by a Darood officer, -10-it could be expected to react unfavorably to the d6tente policy of an Isaaq prime minister. The Darood community spills across the Ethiopian and Kenya borders, and so the Darood felt they had a special stake in continuing the policy of Somali ethnic and cultural irredentism.
Over and above these considerations, developments in the Somali party system had increased the political importance of sub-ethnic allegiances. The most significant development in this direction was the growing split within the dominant Somali Youth League in the years following 1964. As this occurred, the extended lineage groups temporarily lost their significance in party politics, and effective allegiance had fallen back to the smaller constituent lineages which were now combining across their parent divisions. As may be seen in the next section, the Barre regime saw the creation of many opposition groups who attempted to break his rule through treachery, assassination and insurgency. Siad Barre responded in kind, with widespread repression, arbitrary arrest, torture and murder. He became one of the most extravagant human rights' violators. By the end of the Siad period, the Hawiye and Isaaq, as well as many other groups, were totally disaffected from his rule.
POLITICAL/CLAN ORGANIZATIONS
The center of gravity in Somali politics remains the interaction of clan and sub-clan groups. In the pre-1969 parliamentary system, the Isaaq, Majertain and a few other allied groups obtained the largest benefits from their control of the national government. The 1969 coup brought Siad's Marehan and other Darood clans to power. As noted, President Siad Bane pursued strict policies aimed at diminishing the role of other ethnic organizations while rewarding his own Marehan group and allied groups with economic and political favors. Clearly intending to repress and divide his opposition, Barre denied any political outlet to groups that he assumed would be in opposition to his narrow base. Paradoxically, through his own policies, Siad Barre probably facilitated clan political organization as no Somali leader has ever done before. The shape of the political system during Siad's long period of misrule was dominated by the Marehan and the Ogadeni, with efforts to ally with the Dolbuhanta while attempting to prevent an alliance between the Hawiye and the Isaaq.
This is not to say that every Somali automatically assumes a clan posture in every political situation. The Somali Youth League (SYL), which provided the focus of anti-colonial resistance prior to the independences of northern and southern Somalia in 1960 was strongly nationalistic. The SYL was the effective winner of the 1969 elections, but because it supported an entente with Ethiopia, it gained the ire of regionalists and the military who had other aspirations. Siad Bane adopted the Marxist philosophy of the SYL but devoted a great deal of -12-effort to co-opting and making it into his vehicle for politicizing the intellectual classes. At the urging of the Soviet Union, Siad Barre established a single government party in 1976, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). With himself as Secretary General of the SRSP, and head of its central committee, Siad attempted to use the party as a neutral stabilizing force within the political system. Allegedly, he hoped to achieve an equitable distribution of party positions for clan representatives. This goal was impossible to attain in a political culture in which everything else supported the leader's parochial political needs. The SRSP soon languished and served only a protocol requirement in handling visiting Eastern European Communist party delegations. It is likely that Somalia's educated class retains some form of allegiance to the SYL, and it would not be surprising to see a comeback for the SYL, especially if public opinion turns against participants in Restore Hope. Somalis are quite capable of uniting in the face of a foreign danger, with a resultant wave of nationalism. We doubt that the SRSP will ever be heard from again.
Religious groups play a supportive political role in Somalia. They provide the only traditional element which easily crosses inter-clan barriers. Many religious leaders returned to Somalia after Siad's fall. As we learn more about the interior of Somalia, we will probably see that most have been active in repairing the relationships between clans and sub-clans which were fractured in the Siad period.
Cross clan marriages are common in Somalia. This is particularly true in the cities and among students who have studied overseas. This does not usually lead to political identity problems. In cases of mixed clan marriages, there will be allegiance to both groups by both partners. Although no clear research is available on this point, it appears from the readings that children of mixed clan marriages will tend to identify more strongly with the clan of the mother.
Among political groups that now operate in northern and southern Somalia are the following:
The Somali National Alliance ( The Western Somali Liberation Front was established by Siad Barre's government in the 1970s to serve as a vehicle for destabilizing Ethiopian rule in the Ogaden. Most of its members were Ogadeni. During the course of the Ogaden war, the WSLF fought bravely but deeply resented the immediate imposition of political control over "liberated" areas by Siad Barre's native Marehan security forces. During the conflict the WSLF gained the adhesion of many Issa from the Republic of Djibouti. This led to some internal disputes as certain Djibouti Issa followed their own political agenda which included cession of the liberated Issa zones (primarily along the Djibouti-Addis Ababa rail line) to the newly-independent Republic of Djibouti. The WSLF is believed now to number no more than a few hundred adherents.
In the matter of the invasion of the Ogaden in 1977-78, Siad Barre clearly hoped to recover Somali territories under Ethiopian rule, but he also hoped to profit from changing international alliances and to buoy up his own declining dictatorship. In taking on a country with several times his own national population, Siad proved to be much more a clan leader than a national -15 -leader. The performance of WSLF irregulars, often under Somali national army officers, was generally credible in the opening weeks of the Somali invasion of the Ogaden. However, Somali logistics were poor, and the depredations of Siad's political commissars on WSLF units caused very poor morale. Once Ethiopia's new Soviet advisors had obtained the heavy materiel and Cuban advisory personnel on the ground, the Somali offensive quickly collapsed. Based on his bloody 21-year performance, Siad seems to be an unlikely candidate to become a national hero. However, his sons and other family members continue to fight in southern Somalia, and they will likely attempt to make him appear to be a hero of resistance to foreign invasion.
SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL FIGURES
All cultures need folk heros. Excluding the agonies of the recent Ogaden war, for which traditional attitudes are still germinating, there have been two major political-military episodes in the history of the Somali people. Each contributes strongly to Somali ethnic nationalism, as well as to inter-clan relations. Because these historical events and personalities still affect the shape the Somali political system, they are outlined for the reader interested in Somali traditions. Although most of the published reports on these events are the results of Western research, the events and personalities cited are much in the Somali oral tradition. As noted, there are two situations which traditionally unite the quarrelsome Somali clans: (1) religious revivals, normally under a charismatic leader, sometimes leading to a religious crusade, orjihad, against either less devout Somalis or non-Muslim peoples; and (2) resistance to foreign invasion of Somali ethnic territory andlor the reconquest of territories in which Somali culture predominates. In the two case studies cited, the first, the fabled invasion of the Highlands of Ethiopia by Ahmad Gran in the 16th century, includes elements of both of the above mentioned motivations, following a long period of foreign (Ethiopian, or Abyssinian, as it was then known) occupation of territory of what is now northern Somalia. The second national hero, Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, the "Poor Man of God" in Somali tradition and the "Mad Mullah" in British historiography, mounted a 2 1-year resistance to colonial rule between 1899-1920, when his dervishes (soldiers) proved generally invincible in guerrilla and medium-size unit operations against vastly superior British-led international ground forces.
Imam Ahmad Gran -"The Left-handed."
The amity and good-will which had endured over a millennia between the Somali and Ethiopian peoples became badly frayed by the end of the 15th century. Abyssinia, as it was then known, had been largely spared from Islamicjihad, allegedly because of the Prophet's own injunction. However, the Abyssinian king (negus) Yeshaq (1414-1429) expanded his kingdom's political and -16-commercial interests into the trade routes and domains of the Somali Kingdom of Ifat, centered in Zeila. Yehaq declared the Muslims to be "enemies of the Lord" and invaded Ifat in 1415. The local Muslim potentate, king Sa'ad ad-Din, was defeated, and he was pursued up the coast and killed by the invading army. The populations of the coast bridled under the harsh mis-rule of the Abyssinians, but it took over a century to overthrow them.
The instrument of this jihad, undertaken to rid the country of foreign occupation, was Imam Ahmad Gran (termed the "left-handed" by his Abyssinian enemies), who raised a large army from Islamic groups throughout the Horn of Africa. The charismatic Gran (1506-1543) carried the battle to the highlands of Ethiopia. Gran's army may have numbered over 50,000. His aggressive pursuit of his adversaries, special genius for maintenance of long supply lines and battlefield management are the continuing subjects of legend. His successes in Abyssinia led to the first substantial foreign military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. Portuguese troops, led by Christophe da Gama, son of the great explorer, Vasco da Gama (who rounded Cape Horn in 1497 and was the first Western discoverer of the sea route to India), arrived in Abyssinia in the nick of time to save the remainder of the "Christian kingdom." Da Gama was killed in combat in the defense of the Christian kingdom, believed to be the Kingdom of Prester John, the existence of which persisted in the folklore of Medieval Europe.
Certain Somali clans, particularly the Habr Magdle Isaaq, the Harti Darood, and the Marehan, particularly distinguished themselves in the wars against the Abyssinians, and remain a vital part of oral tradition in Djibouti, Somalia and Ethiopia." 5 Portuguese influence remained strong in East Africa until 1728, when they were dislodged from Fort Jesus in Mombasa. This was followed by a long period of Omani rule of the coastal cities, distinguished by its light hand and emphasis on ceremony.
The Ahmad Gran tradition in the Horn is sufficiently ambiguous that he is considered the national hero of the Galla (now known as the Oromo) who are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia; the Somalis; and the Afar, a substantial ethnic minority in Ethiopia, Djibouti and southern Eritrea.
Muhammad Abdullah Hassan -"The Poor Man of God"
With the loss of trade from Harar and increasing pressure from the British, French and Italians for trade and territory, the northern Somali coast had only a shadow of its previous prestige by the end of the 19th century. As often happens in time of political stress and social decay, a I Abir, ibid, p. 12.
-17- Having seen the effectiveness of aviation in Europe, the British colonial authorities sent the famous British "Z" squadron to Somaliland. The 20-pound bombs of the epoch caused little damage to the heavy forts built by the Mullah, but they broke the spirit of the freedom-loving, anticolonial resistance leader. He retreated to the southern Ogaden, where he died of influenza at the end of 1920. Although the Hawiye, Marehan and other clan groups complained bitterly about his activities at the time he directed the dervishes against the enemies of the Dolbuhanta, his memory today remains strong in the hearts of all Somalis and could prove to be a rallying point for antiforeign protest.
• Hcss, ibid., p. 85.
-20-
NORTHERN SOMALIA
Northern Somalia has an Isaaq majority that currently monopolizes the government which declared its independence from Somalia on 18 May 1991. Although the decision to assert sovereignty received a very large majority in the Somali National Movement (SNM) central committee (304 votes against 16 abstentions), the unilateral move led to tensions within the Gadabursi, Warsangali, Dolbuhanta and Issa communities. Isaaq hegemony in the newlyproclaimed "Republic of Somaliland" was further illustrated in the "independent" government announced on 4 June 1991. The most significant ministries (diplomacy, internal and external security, and finance) were awarded to Isaaq clansmen. Other ministries were accorded to Darood (3), Dolbuhanta (2) and Warsangali (1).1 There are no Issa in the government, which probably explains why the major dissident anti-Issa political group moved quickly to "recognize" the independent government in Somaliland (see chronology). Such party recognition, of course, has no international standing, and to the time of this writing, no government has formally recognized the Republic of Somaliland. Several governments, including the U.S., France and the United Kingdom have sent delegations to northern Somalia. After the expected Eritrean referendum vote in favor of independence in April 1993, the international pressures to recognize the Republic of Somaliland will grow.
Dissatisfaction with Isaaq control led to splits within the SNM, and a military coup attempt in Berbera in early 1992. The rebellion in Berbera was led by the former commander-in-chief of the SNM military, Ibrahim Jega Waineh, known as "big ears." His resistance was built around two armored cars and small arms. 19 The rebel group styled itself the "Somaliland Salvation Committee." The civil strife in Somaliland during 1992 led to conciliation efforts by the clan elders and religious leaders, many of whom had been forced into exile during the Siad Barre regime. According to information from Somaliland authorities, 2 " this initiative led to an elaborate reconciliation ceremony in Hargeisa on 7 October. The previously feuding President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali "Tur," and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud "Silanyo," former chairman of the SNM, each participated at the main 
Jul 77
The United States and the United Kingdom announce that they will provide arms to the Somali government. The French government quickly joins the group.
Aug 77
The Soviet Union can no longer sit on the fence in the Ogaden and makes its first public criticism of Somali actions.
Late Aug 77 Siad r -e visits Moscow and makes a final plea to the Soviet government to renounce its support of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. On his return trip, he stops in Cairo and meets with President Sadat.
Sep 77
Ethiopia breaks diplomatic relations with Somalia.
The Soviet Union halts all arms deliveries to Somalia.
Siad Barre makes an impromptu trip to Riyaad to request monetary support.
18 Oct 77 In a highly successful commando operation, German counterterrorist forces recapture a Lufthansa aircraft hijacked to Mogadishu while on a flight between Mallorca and Frankfurt. The terrorists had called for the liberation of 11 German and two Turkish prisoners held in German prisons. Almost simultaneously, the German government announced the suicides of Adreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Jean-Carl Raspe, Baader-Meinhof band killers, while being held in prison. 
Nov 77
The Soviet Union launches what would turn out to be the largest sea and airlift in African history, moving $1 billion in arms, 12,000 Cuban troops and 1,500 Soviet military advisors to Ethiopia.
Jan 78
Ethiopian counteroffensive begins to take effect.
Mar 78
Ethiopian forces retake Jijiga.
Somali troops leave the Ogaden.
9 Mar 78 Siad Barre announces the removal of his last troops from the Ogaden.
Apr 78 Army troops, angered by the defeat in the Ogaden, attempt to assassinate Siad Barre. The coup plotters, mostly air force personnel, were primarily Majertain clan members. The leaders are able to escape the country; they form the Somali Salvation Front (SSF).
Dec 79
In a parody of an election, President Siad Barre is re-elected by the National Assembly for another 6-year term.
Jan 80 Maj. Gen. Siad Barre elected President by the National Assembly.
Apr 80 The U.S. signs an agreement with Somalia for the use of Berbera.
Apr 81
The Somali National Movement (SNM) is founded in London.
Jul 82
Using the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) as its political cover, Ethiopian military forces occupy the towns of Balanbale and Goldogob.
Feb 83
Inter-clan disputes break out in both northern and southern Somalia. In the north, Dolbuhanta clansmen raid Isaaq settlements, seizing weapons, women and cattle. Elements of the SNM take up the Isaaq cause, and they in turn are opposed by Dolbuhanta militia supplemented by national army units. By June 1983, over 160 are reportedly killed in these battles. In concurrent hostilities in the south, fights over water access erupt between Marehan and Hawiye groups. Sporadic raids continue throughout 1983.
Dec 84
Elections for the National Assembly. The Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party is the only party to present candidates, taking all 171 elected (of a total of 177) seats.
Apr 85 Somalia restores relations with Libya, broken in August 1981 when it became apparent that Qadhafi was funding both the SNM and the SSDF. By restoring relations, Siad Barre reportedly hoped to persuade Qadhafi to halt aid to the two rebel organizations and to shift that assistance to Somalia's government. Siad's diplomatic effort is unsuccessful.
-26 -Oct 85 SNM elements bomb the Hargeisa officers' club.
Apr 86
Siad orders the arrest of over 200 officers -mainly air force -said to be implicated in coup plotting. The officers arrested are primarily from the Hawiye and Majertain clan groups. Many had been trained in the United States. There are rumors that events which led to the downfall of pro-U.S. dictators in the Philippines and Haiti persuade Siad that the U.S. plans a similar fate for him.
Mid-Apr 86
Siad orders the arrest of 15 fundamentalist Islamic teachers in northern Somalia. The nationality of the preachers include Egyptians, Iranians and Saudis.
May 86
President Barre is badly injured in an automobile accident in Mogadishu and is medevaced to Saudi Arabia. The accident sparks a fierce power struggle among senior army officers. 24 The struggle is apparently won by a "constitutional faction," led by Brig. Gen. Mahammad 'All Samantar, the first vice president. Samantar, although a toumal, has the support of the army which appreciates his honesty and administrative abilities and hopes that he can establish a government of national conciliation. Opposed to this faction are the "Marehan faction," composed primarily of members of the president's immediate family, including Foreign Minister Abdirahman Jama Barre, the president's son "Maslah," who had made his fortune as the head of the army's quartermaster corps, and the president's senior wife, the formidable Mama Khadija.
Jun 86
Siad Barre returns to Mogadishu from Saudi Arabia. His actions demonstrate to all that age has begun to impair his faculties. Barre takes special care to humiliate Samantar publicly, by calling him an "incompetent" in the presence of other senior officers. He refuses, however, to obey the recommendations of his family to fire Samantar and place a dependable Marehan in his place.
Dec 86
Siad Barre is re-elected President by the national assembly, without opposition. 
Oct 89
The government of L;bya denies that it has sent forces to Mogadishu to prop up the Siad Barre government.
The 20th anniversary of Siad Barre's seizure of power passes without much celebration.
Nov 89
A committee is appointed to set up the rules for multiparty elections.
12-13 Nov 89
A group of Hawiye officers and men belonging to the 4th division at Galka'yo, in the Mudug area of the central region, mutiny. General Barre's son, "Moslah," leads a force of Marehan clansmen to suppress the mutiny. Punishment is meted to local Hawiye villages.
5 Dec 89 A mutiny of Hawiye members in Mogadishu breaks out in protest to the treatment of their families in Mudug. They join with the SNM in a vain attempt to capture Hargeisa.
9 Jan 90 Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Samantar is dismissed because of his inability to stifle the Hawiye protests. The president's half-brother, Jama Barre, loses the Foreign Ministry.
20 Jan 90 Africa Watch, following a 6-month investigation, reports that over 50,000 Somali civilians had been killed in the previous 19 months during a campaign by government forces to quell the several rebel movements threatening the regime.
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2-4 Dec 90
Feuding within the Hawiye clan in Mogadishu leads to looting and a firm government response, with perhaps 50 killed.
4-5 Dec 90
The government abandons any further pretense to respecting the constitution to make many arrests, including more signers of the manifesto.
Dec 90
The American Embassy in Mogadishu calls for voluntary departures among the American community and informs community leaders of the need for a possible evacuation.
6 Dec 90 Soldiers belonging to the Marehan clan of President Barre kill 10 people a-a market in Mogadishu. The government claims that the culprits were bandits. The USC claims increased battle successes against government forces. 24 Apr 91 A joint declaration purportedly signed by the USC, SNM and the Somali Democratic Front (SDM-generally considered to represent the interests of the Rahanwein clan) calls for national unity and territorial integrity. The SNM later repudiates the agreement, claiming that it was issued without the agreement of its central committee.
4-7 May 91
Northern clan group; gather in Burao in an effort to hold reconciliation.
May 91
The governments of Italy and Egypt call for a meeting of all Somali liberation movements in Cairo on 8 July to prepare for national unity.
18 May 91 At a special congress of the SNM at Burao, the delegates support a unilateral declaration of independence by SNM civilian head Abdirahman Ahmed Ali "Tur," in northern Somalia. Hargeisa becomes the capital of the Republic of Somaliland, including all of what was British Somaliland. This declaration followed the desertion by Barre in the south and considerable northern sentiment, especially from the military side of the SNM.
Jun 91
The OAU, meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, calls for the Somaliland Republic to rescind its secession declaration.
The first cabinet of the Somaliland Republic is announced. SNM chairman Abdirahman Ahmed Ali "Tur" is made provisional president for a term of 2 years.
5-11 Jun 91
Efforts by Djiboutian President Hassan Gouled to broker peace between the contending Somali factions. These efforts come to naught. This meeting, termed "Djibouti I" brought delegations representing the USC, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (Majertain), SPM, United Somali Front (Issa) and the Somali Democratic Alliance (Gadabursi). The SNM did not come to Djibouti. A cease-fire is agreed to, and joint action against a return by Siad Barre is agreed upon.
15-16 Jun 91
Serious fighting in Mogadishu between the local Abgal partisans of Ali Mahdi and the Habr Gedr Sa'ad clansmen of General Mohammed Farah Aideed.
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Jul 91
The SPM reconquern Kismayu. General Aideed refuses to let the Pakistani forces guard the airport, the piers in the port, or the food convoys.
26 Oct 92 UN special envoy, Mohammed Sahnoun, resigns under pressure from New York after his statements in the media criticizing UN relief policies in Somalia.
10 Nov 92 Pakistani units take control of the Mogadishu airport. Their control is periodically affected by "technicals" attempting to extract funds from relief agencies using the airport.
12 Nov 92 A CARE relief convoy is attacked in an ambush while transporting food supplies to Baydhabo, a southern town heavily affected by starvation.
The new UN special representative, Ismat Kittani (Iraqi, former UN General Assembly president in 1981) expresses dismay over the support being given UN relief efforts.
Nov 92
The Deputies Committee of the National Security Council reconsider the options in Somalia and, on the basis of a recommendation from Chief of Stuff Colin Powell, decide in favor of intervention. According to the press, the decision was based on two compelling considerations: (1) the scale of the human disaster in Somalia; and (2) the realization that the U.S. was the only world power able to do something about it.,
3-5 Dec 92
Relief coordination conference meets under UN auspices.
Dec 92
The imminent arrival of U.S. forces is signaled by the arrival of U.S. Navy transport vessels off Mogadishu. Two Naval F-14s crisscross the city at 1000 feet.
In a nighttime landing, under the klieg lights of the world press, the first U.S. Marine and Naval Seal contingents move into Mogadishu, without casualties, and take charge of the port area and the international airport. They are joined by forward elements of the 13th Demi-Brigade of the French Foreign Legion, arriving from their base in Djibouti. Other national military units expected include Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
As "technicals" and other armed groups leave Mogadishu to avoid contact with the U.S landing force, the security situation in the interior begins to degrade. The ICRC reports that its compound is attacked by bandits.
The UN military force commander, Marine LTG Robert B. Johnston, arrives in Mogadishu. Johnston had been General Schwarzkopf's chief of staff in the Persian Gulf War.
A Marine force takes over the abandoned Soviet-built built at Bale Dogle, half way between Mogadishu and Baidoa.
s Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could do Something About'," Washington Post (6 December 1992), p. Al.
-38 -Following meetings over 2 days at the American Embassy in Mogadishu, Hawiye leaders Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohammed Aideed agree to a cease-fire and a general truce. This has been the first meeting between Ali Mahdi and Aideed in over a year. The seven-point agreement calls for a reconstitution of the USC, disarmament of all irregulars, including the so-called "technicals," and the disappearance of all internal barriers, including the "green line," separating the two forces.
12 Dec 92 UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali publicly calls for U.S. forces to disarm the clans and take steps to ensure political stability.
The relief agency CARE estimates that 350,000 Somalis will die of starvation during 1992. At least 2 million more remain at risk.
The first relief ship since 24 October enters Mogadishu harbor.
14 Dec 92 Marine General Joseph P. Hoar, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, as well as other senior U.S. Government officials, reject Boutros Ghali's call to disarm the Somali clans. General Hoar states that the issue of disarmament is "a political issue, one that needs to be settled first and foremost by the Somalis."
15-16 Dec 92
The first Marine units enter Baidoa. After securing the airfield, more units are flown in.
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